We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders.
Introduction and experimental procedures
We examine behavior in a variation of the ultimatum game (UG) that we call "Yes or No-game" (Y/N). Unlike in UG, the responder in Y/N does not know the proposal when deciding between "yes" (acceptance) and "no" (rejection). In this sense, accepting means to "buy a pig in a poke".
Previous research has shown that many responders in the UG are unwilling to accept 'unfair' offers (e.g., Roth, 1995) , and that proposers offer substantial amounts with the modal offer typically being half of the pie.
1 Not knowing the offer, however, creates moral hazard problems: because responders cannot observe the 'quality' of the offer,
proposers may want to behave more unfairly. In fact, we find that offers in our Y/N treatment are significantly lower than in the UG and similar to the dictator game (DG), where responders have no veto power at all. While the greediness of Y/N proposers is anticipated by the responders, we do not observe a single rejection.
Our computerized (via Fischbacher 1999's z-Tree) experiment was performed at the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute. Participants were undergraduate students from different disciplines at the University of Jena. We ran eight sessions, each involving 28 participants. Two sessions were devoted to UG, two to DG, and the remaining four to Y/N, yielding 28 independent observations for dictators, and 28 (56) independent observations for each of the two parties in DG (Y/N). In all three games, the monetary pie was €20 and only integer allocations were allowed.
In all treatments, the first mover 
First mover behavior
The distributions of proposals in each of the three treatments are shown in Figure 1 . The elicited beliefs support the view that first movers respond strategically to the veto power of second movers in UG. 23 out of those 25 proposers stating beliefs expect monotonic acceptance rates: higher offers have a higher probability of being accepted.
3
Given the beliefs, we can compute the average expected proposer
, as shown in Figure 2 . 4 The function
, which are the most frequent actual offers. Thus, proposers in UG are, on average, maximizing own expected payoffs. However, expected and actual average payoffs differ significantly (two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p < 0.001) as proposers tend to overestimate the responders' willingness to punish greedy offers. 
Second mover behavior
All 56 responders in Y/N accept. Acceptance rates in UG are illustrated in Figure 3 : more than 67% of the responders reject minimal offers of 1 and 2 in UG, and average acceptance rates are monotonically increasing to one, when the equal split is reached. In Y/N, only 57.1% of the responders state first order beliefs. Their average expected offer is 4 with a standard deviation of 3.35, whereas the average actual offer they are granted is higher (6). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (two-sided) comparing the distributions of expected and actual offers for these responders reveals a significant difference (p = 0.047). All responders with second order beliefs (83.9%) anticipate that A expects acceptance. In sum, Y/N-responders 'buy the pig in the poke' even though they rightly expect proposers to be much greedier than in the UG, and even greedier than they actually are.
Conclusions
Proposers offer significantly more in the ultimatum game than in a game where responders only have unconditional veto power. Offers do not differ when responders have unconditional veto power or no veto power at all. Surprisingly, however, responders with unconditional veto power never reject, even when they anticipate small offers. As an illustration, observe that, on average, Y/N-responders expected an offer of 4€ and never rejected; by contrast, the same offer in the UG had a 46%-chance of being rejected.
It appears that, in case of uncertainty about offers, responders do not base their decision in a straightforward way on their expectations and beliefs -as, e.g., suggested
by simple theories of fairness (see footnote 3). Rather, the uncertainty seems to interact with fairness considerations in non-trivial ways (see also Bolton et al., 2005 , for another observation along these lines). We can think of at least two explanations for the responders' willingness to 'buy a pig in the poke'. First, "in dubio pro reo": responders refrain from punishing, because they may suffer much more from punishing an innocent proposer than from accepting a greedy proposal. Second, "in dubio pro meo": responders refrain from punishing, because even a small chance that the proposer is fair may provide a sufficient excuse for selfishly taking the money. (n = 28) 5.18 4 3.98 UG (n = 28) 9.11 10 1.50 Y/N (n = 56) 5.80 5.5 3.48 Fig. 1 . Distribution of actual proposals.
-10 - Fig. 2 . Proposers' expected and actual payoffs in UG.
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Appendix A. Laboratory protocol
This section contains the written instructions distributed to the subjects as well as a description of the belief elicitation procedures for all sessions of the experiment.
A.1. Written instructions (translation from German)
Welcome and thank you very much for participating in this experiment. You receive €2.50 for having shown up on time. Please read the instructions -which are identical for all participants -carefully. If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand. We will answer your questions individually. It is strictly forbidden to communicate with other participants during the experiment. It is very important that you follow this rule. Otherwise we must exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. In this experiment, two participants will interact with each other just once. Each of the two members of a pair will be randomly assigned one of two roles: A or B. Your role will be told to you at the beginning of the experiment. Each pair can share €20.00. A has the right to propose the distribution of the €20.00. For each possible distribution, B must specify if (s)he accepts or rejects it by checking the corresponding box (thus B is required to make 19 decisions). After A and B have made their choices, their payoff is determined as follows: if B has accepted the actual proposal by A, then both get what A has proposed, i.e., A earns a and B earns b; if B has rejected the actual proposal, then both earn nothing, i.e., the €20.00 are lost.]
[Participants in DG read: B has to accept the proposition of A, and has no influence on the eventual distribution.]
